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Antitrust: Shared Information Between the FTC
and the Department of Justice
Judy Beckner Sloan*

An increasing number of corporate activities are subjected to
federal regulation, regulation that is often accomplished by requiring corporate disclosures of information. By disclosing such
information, a corporation and its officials may subject themselves to future civil or criminal liability. Moreover, because
agencies such as the Internal Ftevenue Service, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
and the Justice Department have been given both civil and criminal enforcement responsibilities, the possibility exists that information obtained by an agency pursuant to a civil proceeding may
be used by the agency in a later criminal investigation or proceeding.' The same possibility of shared information exists where two
agencies are charged with enforcement in the same area, such as
the Justice Department and the FTC's joint responsibility for
antitrust enforcement.2
The possible use of information obtained through regulatory
activities or civil discovery by one agency in a later criminal
proceeding by the same or a different agency raises substantial
constitutional questions, including issues of due process and selfin~rimination.~
These constitutional rights provide two of the pos* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., 1967, University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, University of Maryland.
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2. The issue of information sharing has arisen most often in the context of IRS
investigations that result in information being shared with the Justice Department in
order to bring criminal actions. See, e.g., United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248
(D. Mass. 1953). This practice may also be occurring between other agencies, including
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. See FTC Investigational File
No. 721-0091 (1978). The issue has also arisen where private plaintiffs wish to share, or
the government wishes to obtain, information the plaintiffs have obtained in a private civil
action. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 68,840 (S.D.N .Y.
1976). The Justice Department's statutory authority for antitrust investigation is provided
by 4 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 4 (1976). The FTC's authority is based on P 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. # 45 (1976).
3. The constitutional issues arise because of the fundamental differences between
civil and criminal proceedings. As stated by the court in Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d
478,487 (5th Cir. 1962): "There is a clear-cut distinction between private interests in civil
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sible defenses a corporation may assert when it finds itself within
the sights of a governmental double-barreled prosecution.
How can a corporation prevent information it has been forced
to disclose from being used against it or corporate officials in a
simultaneous or subsequent criminal or civil proceeding? The
corporation must a t least (1)establish that information is being
or will be shared,' (2) appropriately time the objection to the
sharing,' (3) select the best forum in which to complain about the
har ring,^ and (4) select the best remedy to prevent the sharing.'
The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, each possessing power to enforce the antitrust laws, provide good subjects for consideration of the possible hazards confronting a corporation and its officials exposed to simultaneous
investigations. This Article will consider defenses a corporation
or its officers might raise and remedies they might seek if they
are involved, actually or potentially, in simultaneous proceedlitigation and the public interest in a criminal prosecution, between a civil trial and a
criminal trial, and between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure."
4. Courts do not appear as concerned about whether information is actually shared
as they are about whether there is any potential for problems of self-incrimination or fair
use in the criminal proceeding when both civil and criminal prosecutions are occurring
simultaneously. See Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); SEC v. Vesco, [19721973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.L. REP. (CCH) 7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dienstag v.
Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. One court, in SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973Transfer Binder] FED.SEC.L. REP. (CCH)
7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), was willing to grant relief when a criminal proceeding was only
contemplated. Relief usually has been granted, however, only where both the civil and
criminal prosecutions are underway. See Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1964);Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
National Discount Corp. v. Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
6. In the case of contemporaneous criminal and civil proceedings, most courts hold
that the judge in the civil proceedings can stay or limit discovery in the civil trial until
the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. See United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F. Supp.
1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stay of civil proceedings); Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stay of discovery). The issue of what a judge can do in criminal proceedings, however, appears to be unresolved. See United States v. Simon, 262 F. Supp. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curium as moot sub nom.
Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967). For a general discussion of this area, see Comment, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 COLUM.
L. REV.1277 (1967); Note,
Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH.L. REV.738 (1968).
7. Remedies requested may include a stay of discovery in the civil trial, Perry v.
McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), suspension of the civil proceedings until after
termination of the criminal proceedings, United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1053
(S.D.N.Y. 1976),a protective order, SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), or an attempt to assure that information furnished to the investigatory staff of an administrative agency not be used by its adjudicatory staff, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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ings. The focus of this Article will be on the FTC and the Justice
Department, as well as the various methods these agencies use in
antitrust enforcement; however, since other federal agencies have
dual enforcement powers or concurrent jurisdiction over additional business areas, the issues considered here also have application elsewhere in administrative law.

11. ANTITRUSTJOINT
RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE FTC
AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
Congress has given both the FTC and the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department responsibility for antitrust regulation.
The FTC is empowered by section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prevent individuals, partnerships, and corporations from engaging in unfair methods of c~mpetition.~
The FTC
carries out enforcement actions by adjudicatory proceedings governed by its own rules of procedure;@if the FTC finds unfair
competition, it can issue a cease-and-desist order.1°
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has been
given powers to bring both criminal and civil actions. The actions
are brought in federal district court and are governed by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 2 of the Sherman Act expressly provides for
criminal penalties for those found guilty of monopolizing trade. l1
Courts have implicitly found authorization for the Justice Department to bring civil actions under the Sherman Act when it
is not possible to prove criminal intent.12The Justice Department
8. 15 U.S.C. 4 45(a)(l) (1976).
9. The FTC's rules in adjudicatory proceedings have recently been changed. For t h i
most recent version, see 43 Fed. Reg. 56,862 (1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. $8 3.1-.72). One
result of these changes is to give much greater control to the administrative law judge.
& TRADE
REG.REP.(BNA) No. 882,
For a discussion of the changes, see [I9781 ANTITRUST
a t A-15 (Sept. 28, 1978).
10. The FTC retains the power to modify the order if it chooses. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)
(1976). The order in its final form is reviewable by the appropriate federal court of appeals,
and it has priority over other cases. Id. 45(c).
11. 15 U.S.C. 4 2 (1976). Prior to 1974 such behavior was a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of $50,000, a prison sentence, or both. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), as amended by Act of Jul. 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (revised 1974). In 1974,
however, the punishment was changed by Congress to a felony with a fine of $1,000,000
for a corporation, $100,000 for an individual, a prison sentence of three years, or both a t
the court's discretion. Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 2).
12. The element of criminal intent in antitrust actions was most recently discussed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
The Court indicated that since a violation of the Sherman Act is now a felony, a corporate
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relies on civil actions more often than criminal actions; criminal
penalties have been fairly light. l3
The antitrust jurisdiction of the FTC and the Justice Department overlaps in many areas. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission Act can be seen as a supplement to the Sherman Act. Traditionally, by a liaison arrangement, the two departments have
coordinated their investigations.14 This arrangement began in
1938 and was formalized in 1948.15Under the arrangement, before
an investigation is begun the investigating agency informs the
other agency concerning the investigation and reveals the party
to be investigated, the charges, the product involved, and the fact
that an investigation is contemplated.l"f the matter is pending
in the other agency, there will be further liaison activities; otherwise, the investigation commences.17 Because of this arrangement, patterns in the types of industries that each agency investigates have developed. l8
Recent litigation, however, indicates that the two agencies
may no longer be making independent investigations, but instead
defendant cannot be held to a standard of strict liability. Actual criminal intent must be
shown. Id. at6442-43& n.18.
365,
13. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON.
389-95 (1970). The policy toward few criminal prosecutions and light penalties, however,
may be changing. There are indications that the Justice Department is increasing its
criminal prosecutions under the amended Act. See, e.g., O'Leary, Criminal Antitrust and
the Corporate Executive: The Man in the Middle, 63 A.B.A.J. 1389, 1390 (1977); [I9781
TRADE
REG.REP.(CCH) NO. 359, a t 6 (Nov. 13,1978). The Justice Department has issued
guidelines recommending that there be an 18-month base prison sentence for conviction
of a Sherman Act violation, with the use of fines only if the court refuses to impose the
recommended prison sentence. See Justice Department Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act, reprinted in [I9771 ANTITRUST
& TRADE
REG.REP.(BNA) No. 803, a t F-1 to -3 (Mar. 1,1977). The Department of Justice
is also recommending minimum corporate fines of $100,000. Id. a t F-5 to -6.
14. Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and
the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW.2075, 2075-76 (1976).
15. Id. a t 2077.
16. Id.
17. Id. a t 2077-78.
18. Areas traditionally investigated by the Justice Department Antitrust Division
include the following: banking and securities; aviation; newspaper acquisitions; aluminum; tire manufacturing; computers; international agreements; communications; brewing acquisitions; automobile industry monopolization and dealer relations; steel (primary)
patents and knowhow (with some major exceptions). Id. a t 2080.
The FTC has traditionally investigated the following areas: brewing monopolization
and price discrimination; autoparts monopolization and acquisitions; tires, batteries, and
accessories distribution; cement; shopping center trade restraints; department store acquisitions; health care; food and food distribution; petroleum monopolization; copiers and
business machines; franchising; textile mill products acquisitions; dairy industry acquisitions. Id.
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are supplying information to each other on concurrent investigations." The result of this practice is that information obtained by
the FTC through its more liberal discovery methods may be supplied to the Justice Department for use in criminal prosecution^.^^
The impact of this sharing of information should be of considerable concern to a corporation with potential antitrust problems,
especially when the rapidly expanding power of the FTC to gather
information about corporate activities through its investigatory,
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and regulatory activities is considered.

111. THEROLEOF THE FTC'
The FTC has broad investigatory powers. It is empowered

"[t]o gather and compile information concerning, and to investi-

gate from time to time . . . any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce, excepting
banks and common carrier^."^^ This provision has been interpreted as permitting simultaneous investigatory and adjudicatory proceedings by the FTCez2
The FTC recently used its investigatory power to initiate a
line-of-business and corporate-pattern reports program." The
19. Letter from Joel R. Platt, Attorney, Chicago Regional Office of the FTC, to Earl
E. Pollock (July 26, 1978) (attached as an exhibit in a motion to the FTC to stay discovery,
FTC Investigational File No. 721-0091 (1978).
[Tlhe FTC has made available to the United States Attorney all of the material contained in its files relating to this matter and will continue to do so in
the future. In addition, the U.S. Attorney's office has authorized our office to
indicate to you that they will seek to obtain any new information which the FTC
receives.
If you wish to object to the FTC sharing newly submitted information with the
Justice Department or any other agency, you may make a request for confidentiality under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) which is incorporated into the FTC Rules a t
4.lO(a)(2).

Id.
20. See Roll, supra note 14, a t 2078.
21. 15 U.S.C. 4 46(a) (1976).
22. See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. FTC, 398 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v.
W C , 291 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 416 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1969).
23. As described in [I9731 ANTITRUST
& TRADEREG. REP. (BNA) No. 626, a t A-17
(Aug. 14, 1973):
[Tlhe FTC's line-of-business proposal would require most corporations with
assets of $50 million or more to report their profits, revenue, advertising expenditures, and R&D costs for any of about 400 product categories ranging from the
manufacturing of food products, to industrial trucks and tractors, and to computers. As of now, the number of firms covered by the reporting requirements
would be close to 2,000.
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FTC has indicated that one purpose of these reports is to select
possible targets for antitrust enforcement? However, the value of
the information that the FTC will obtain by these reports is disp ~ t e d After
. ~ ~ the program was implemented in 1974, numerous
corporations responded by initiating court challenges to the new
program. These challenges have been largely unsuccessful. The
Supreme Court recently refused to grant certiorari to consider
whether the FTC has authority to require such reports.z6With the
failure of these court challenges, it is likely that the FTC will be
able to force compliance with its reporting program.27The question as to the confidentiality of the data that the corporations
furnish remains unanswered.
The FTC also has rulemaking power. The basis of this power
was provided by amendments 7(b) and (c) to the procedures and
rules of practice of the FTC in 1962." As a result of these amendments, the F'TC began promulgating trade regulation rules that
were to be used as standards for obtaining cease-and-desist orders.
Since these rules lacked an explicit statutory basis, there was
a question concerning their validity. The test of the FTC's power
to promulgate these rules came in National Petroleum Refiners
Association v. FTC? The D.C. Circuit held that section 6(g) of
the Federal Trade Commission ActJ0empowered the FTC to promulgate such rules and that the rules have the force of substanthe Supreme Court
tive law. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson CO.~'
-

24. Id. at A-16.
25. For a discussion of the lack of value of the information, see Benston, The Baffling
Oct. 1975, at 174; Bock, Line-of-Business
New Numbers Game at the FTC, FORTUNE,
Reporting: A Quest for a Snark, CONF.BOARD
REC.,Nov. 1975, at 10.
26. See, e.g., American Air Filter Co. v. FTC, 439 U.S. 958 (1979) (denying cert. to
Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The
appellate court rejected the corporation's arguments that the FTC lacked power to require
the reporting procedures, that the program violated the confidentiality provisions of the
Census Act, that rulemaking procedures should have been initiated before establishing the
program, and that the FTC had exceeded its investigatory powers. The court also indicated that the issue of the use of the line-of-business and corporate-pattern data by the
FTC in other administrative proceedings should be raised in those proceedings. For other
earlier decisions reaching similar conclusions, see A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp.
1108 (D. Del. 1975), revised, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
& TRADE
REG.REP.(BNA) No. 888, at A-1 (Nov. 9, 1978).
27. See [I9781 ANTITRUST
28. See 27 Ted. Reg. 4636, 4796-97 (1962). For a discussion of the various Federal
Trade Commissioners' viewpoints at the time of the amendments, see Burrus & Teter,
Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO.L.J. 1106 (1966).
29. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
30. 15 U.S.C. 5 46(g) (1976).
31. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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indicated that through its rulemaking power the FTC, in addition
to regulating deceptive acts and practices, could regulate unfair
business practices.
Explicit statutory authorization of rulemaking power was
given to the FTC by the Magnuson-Moss amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act in 1975.32Prior to instituting a
rule, the FTC must generally follow formal rulemaking procedures. These include publication of notice of the proposed rule in
the Federal Register, allowance of submission of written materials by interested parties, opportunity for interested parties to
present materials at an informal hearing, preparation of a transcript of any such presentation, and promulgation of a rule based
on the evidence in the record.33After a rule is issued, it may be
challenged in the appropriate United States court of appeals. If
the rule is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, it can be overturned. Because of the relatively recent
enactment of this amendment, the areas in which the FTC will
choose to exercise its rulemaking power are not yet defined. The
FTC could use the authority, in a method similar to the line-ofbusiness reports procedure, to promulgate rules requiring disclosure of facts that could later be used in antitrust enforcement
actions.
Another means for the FTC to obtain information that might
later be used in antitrust enforcement actions is through premerger notification requirements. Premerger notification requirements were part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-

32. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 57(a)). For a discussion of the rulemaking authority of the FTC and the effect of this amendment, see Kinter
& Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer
L. REV. 651 (1975); Nelson, The Politicization of FTC
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER
Rulemaking, 8 CONN.L. REV.413 (1976); Rosch, Rulemaking Under the Federal Trade
L.J. 515 (1975); Tyler & Erickson,
Commission Improvement Act, 44 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
The Federal Trade Commission Today: The New Improved Improvements Act, 3
HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 849 (1976).
33. These requirements should be considered in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee the Court indicated that judicial review of agency
rulemaking is limited to assuring that the agency rulemaking meet the minimal statutory
requirements. For a thorough discussion of Vermont Yankee, see Breyer, Vermont Yankee
and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV.L. REV.1833 (1978);
Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat
Different View, 91 HAW.L. REV.1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution
of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV.L. REV.1805 (1978).
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ment Act of 1976.34The rationale for enactment of the requirements was to prevent future antitrust violations by controlling
present corporate mergers." The premerger notification provisions require the Justice Department and the FTC to be notified
before mergers of certain size corporations take place.36The FTC,
through its rulemaking power, is authorized to determine the
form of the required report.37Once the report is filed, the merger
can take place in thirty days-unless it is challenged in federal
court by the Department of Justice or the FTC.38The FTC can
extend the thirty-day period for up to twenty additional days if
. ~ ~ penit requests further information from the c o r p o r a t i ~ nCivil
alties of up to $10,000 per day exist for companies and individuals
who fail to comply with the premerger notification provision^.^^
The form promulgated by the FTC requires, for example,
information as to the dollar revenue of manufactured products, a
description of voting securities, and submission of all documents
that may have been prepared for the purpose of evaluating the
acquisition in advance of the merger." The potential use of the
information the FTC collects from this form may not appear
great; however, the FTC indicated in its comments about the
form that it does not view the information obtained from the form
as confidential as to use within the agency." The FTC also indicated that its interpretation of the confidentiality section of the
premerger notification provisions permits it or the Justice Department to use the information in any administrative or judicial
proceedings in which the agencies are involved." The FTC has
indicated that it would instruct its staff and the staff of the Justice Department to give the companies notice whenever the information submitted on the premerger forms might become part of
34. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 5 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. $ 18a).
35. For a discussion of this act, see Kintner, Griffin, & Goldston, The Hart-ScottL.REV.1(1977);
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO.WASH.
Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM.L. REV.
679 (1977).
36. 15 U.S.C.§ 18a (1976).
37. Id. § 18a(d).
38. Id. § 18a(b). In the case of a cash tender offer, however, the time limit is 15 days.
Id. $ 18a(b)(l)(B).
39. Id. § 18a(e). In the case of a cash tender offer, however, the time period can be
extended by only 10 days. Id.
40. Id. § 18a(g)(l).
41. For a copy of the form, see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,552 (1978).
42. See id. a t 33,518-19 (1978).
43. Id. at 33,519.
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the public record.44There has been no litigation to date concerning the use of this data by the FTC.
The premerger notification requirements, the line-ofbusiness/corporate-patternreports, and the rulemaking power are
all examples of the FTC's increasing ability to obtain a wide
range of information concerning corporate activities that may
later be used against corporations in antitrust enforcement actions. The FTC also has its traditional means of acquiring information through investigations or adjudicatory proceedings. The
possibility that information the FTC collects may be turned over
to the Justice Department for use in criminal prosecutions is a
frightening prospect for corporate executives. A successful criminal prosecution can lead to corporate and individual fines and can
stigmatize the individual defendant with a felony conviction,
which can result in the loss of professional memberships. Another
possible result of finding criminal liability is the susceptibility of
the corporation to a parens patriae action, a civil action that can
be brought by a state attorney general for violations of the Sherman
This course of action is another result of the Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1976.
An additional hazard for a corporation found guilty in criminal or civil proceedings instituted by the FTC or the Antitrust
Division is potential liability in a private antitrust action for
treble damages and attorneys' fees." A final judgment against the
defendant in a criminal or civil antitrust proceeding is prima facie
evidence against the defendant in a later private antitrust act i ~ n Even
. ~ ~ if there has not been a final judgment against the
corporate defendant, the possibility exists that information the
FTC has in its files may be used against a corporation in a private
antitrust action. As the Supreme Court stated in a decision involving the FTC:
The greater resources and expertise of the Commission and
its staff render the private suitor a tremendous benefit aside
from any value he may derive from a judgment or decree. Indeed, so useful is this service that government proceedings are
recognized as a major source of evidence for private parties.48
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
46. Id. !j 15.
47. Id. § 16(a).
48. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 US.311,
319 (1965).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Freedom of
Information Act provide the mechanism for a plaintiff in a private antitrust action to obtain information the government holds
concerning a corporate defendant.49Limitations on discovery
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are that the information must be relevant, not privileged, and not the work product
of an attorney.50Statutory limits on information the federal government will provide under the Freedom of Information Act include trade secrets, customer lists, privileged or confidential information, and interagency memos.51There are few statutory limits on the release of information to a private antitrust plaintiff.52

IV. THEROLEOF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
The Justice Department has a number of methods of acquiring information when investigating corporate antitrust violations.
One method is the use of informal means.53Justice Department
employees read newspapers and journals and receive tips from
disgruntled employees or competitor^.^^ Another source of information is the voluntary letter request, backed up by two other
means of obtaining information-civil investigatory demands
(CID's) and the subpoena power.55
The CID powers were recently increased for the Justice Department by the Antitrust Improvement Act. The Assistant Attorney General or the Attorney General can use the CID to request documents or depositions or issue interrogatories to corporations, partnerships, associations, or individuals prior to a civil
or criminal proceeding." The conduct under investigation must
involve antitrust violations or merger activities that may result
in violation^.^^
The information obtained may be used by the Department
49. See 5 U.S.C. Q 552 (1976);FED.R. CN. P. 26.
50. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(b)(l), (3).
51. 5 U.S.C. 8 552(b)(4), (5) (1976).
52. In a recent case, the New York Attorney General attempted to use the Freedom
of Information Act to obtain information that a corporate defendant had provided to the
FTC to use against the corporation in a parens patriae action for violations of state
antitrust law. I19791 TRADE
REG.REP. (CCH) NO. 377, at 5 (Mar.20, 1979).
53. See Reeves, How the Antitrust Division Can Use Its New Powers to Obtain
Statistical Records and Testimony From Trade Associations and Trade Association
Executives, 22 ANTITRUSTBULL.355, 357 (1977).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. Q 1312(a) (1976).
57. Id. 8 1312(b)(l).
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of Justice before a court or grand jury and may be given to the
FTC upon written request.58If an individual or corporation refuses to comply, the Justice Department can seek judicial enforcement in federal district court, where all objections to the CID
must be aired." If the individual or corporation still refuses to
comply after a court order, the Department of Justice can seek
criminal penalties, including a fine of up to $5,000, a prison term
of up to five years, or both.'O Information cannot be obtained,
however, that is protected from disclosure by either the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or restrictions on the subpoena duces
tecum." For instance, during depositions possible objections
might include improper motive and first, fourth, and fifth
amendment privilege^.'^
The grand jury is another means by which the Justice Department can acquire information about the activities of a corporation. The Justice Department may begin an investigation with
a grand jury but later decide to use civil proceeding^.'^ The use
of the grand jury is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
P r o c e d ~ r eThe
. ~ ~Rules govern such aspects of grand jury proceedings as the means by which the jurors are summoned, objections
to the grand jury or jurors, who may be present, the secrecy of the
proceedings, and the findings included in the return of the indictment.65
The corporate official subpoened to testify before a grand
jury must be careful if he wishes to preserve his fifth amendment
privilege. A witness before a federal grand jury does not have the
right to have his attorney present while he is questioned,'' nor
does he have the right to be informed that he is the target of the
grand jury investigation."

A crucial issue for a corporation or its officers under investigation or indictment by the Justice Department for a criminal
58. Id. § 1313(d).
59. Id. § 1314(d).
60. 18 U.S.C. 0 1505 (1976).
61. 15 U.S.C. 8 1312(c) (1976).
62. Reeves, supra note 53, at 360.
63. Id. at 358-59.
64. See FED.R. CRIM.P. 6.
65. Id.
66. Id. 6(d).
67. Cf. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (a witness before a grand
jury did not have to be given Miranda warnings before his testimony).
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antitrust violation is how to prevent any information they may
have previously or currently disclosed to the FTC from being used
against them in a criminal proceeding. They can make several
arguments. Each of these arguments involves two important issues. First, how can it be established that the FTC is in fact
giving information it has gathered to the Justice Department for
use in criminal proceedings? Assuming that the information sharing would be invalid if proved, the corporation or officers can
argue that since information sharing occurs solely within the
province of the government, the burden of proving that information sharing has occured should not be on the private party. Instead, it should be up to the FTC and the Justice Department to
demonstrate that information sharing has not occurred. The corporation or officers can also seek a suspension of any FTC investigation until after the criminal prosecution is concluded and a ban
on any use of evidence gathered by the FTC from any criminal
trial, unless it could have been obtained independently through
criminal discovery or was part of the public record.
The other important issue is timing. Should the objection to
the shared information be made, for example, in FTC adjudicatory proceedings in an effort to stop an administrative subpoena,
in a private civil action, or in the criminal case itself? Another
aspect of timing involves ripeness-can a corporation or its officers object to information sharing before the FTC when no criminal prosecution is currently pending?68
If the corporation or officers can overcome the problems of
timing and proof, the issue becomes what substantive law and
arguments can be marshalled to attack the information sharing.
There are several theories that can be advanced to support the
substantive attack.

A. FTC Procedural Rules
The first theory that may be advanced to defeat information
sharing was espoused in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.," which
concerned the sharing of information between the FTC's investi68. The appellate court in the line-of-business report cases indicated that concern
over confidentiality of data was premature and should be raised in the specific proceeding
where the violation was occurring. See, e.g., Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report
Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In another pertinent decision, In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Ligitation, 465 I?. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ill. 1979), the district court
held that claims of fifth amendment privilege were not applicable where there appeared
to be little chance of any future criminal prosecution.
69. 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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gatory and adjudicatory staffs. Atlantic Richfield was simultaneously involved in an adjudicatory proceeding concerning alleged
antitrust violations and a congressionally authorized investigation of the natural gas industry, both conducted by the FTC.
Atlantic Richfield was seeking to ensure that the documents obtained by the FTC investigatory staff would not be used by the
FTC staff in the adjudicatory proceeding without an opportunity
for the administrative law judges or Atlantic Richfield to object.
Two arguments were advanced by Atlantic Richfield. First,
Atlantic Richfield argued that such a sharing of information was
violative of the FTC's procedural rules that arguably did not
permit access by the prosecutorial staff to documents obtained by
investigatory subpoena. Second, Atlantic Richfield argued that
such information sharing was violative of due process.
Atlantic Richfield based its first argument, concerning the
separation of adjudicatory and investigatory functions of the
FTC, on the existence of separate rules of procedure for each
activity. The existence of separate rules of discovery procedure for
investigative and adjudicative proceedings conducted by the FTC
indicated that information was not freely transferable between
the two proceedings. The FTC responded by arguing that such
information shariqg was permissible where, as in this case, the
adjudicatory proceeding was launched in good faith. The D.C.
Circuit agreed with Atlantic Richfield's argument. Such sharing
of information, according to the court, would remove important
powers of the administrative law judge to limit, quash, or approve
subpoenas in adjudicatory proceeding^.^^ The court concluded,
however, that the FTC's position on the issue was unclear and
remanded the case so the FTC could clarify its rule on the use of
investigatory documents in adjudicative proceedings.
Although the court used Atlantic Richfield's first argument
as the basis for its decision, it indicated in dicta its opinion regarding the due process issue. The court concluded that due process issuespwere inherently involved if such a sharing of information were permitted. The FTC has not yet clarified its position
on this issue.71
Thus a corporation or its officers could argue that if the FTC
rules of procedure do not permit internal sharing of information,
70. This argument may have been strengthened by the new FTC rules that seek to
give the ad,ministrative law judge greater control over adjudicatory proceedings. See
[I9781 ANTITRUST& TRADE
REG.REP. (BNA) No. 882, at A-15 (Sept. 28, 1978).
71. See id. at A-16.
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then, a fortiori, the FTC should not be permitted to provide such
information to the Justice Department for use in criminal proceedings. The ultimate basis of such an argument is due process.

B. Due Process
The Supreme Court has recognized limits upon the information gathering powers of administrative agencies, including the
FTC. In United States v. Morton Salt C O .the
~ ~issue was whether
the FTC could require corporations to file reports showing their
compliance with a cease-and-desist order. The Court stated:
The judicial subpoena power not only is subject to specific constitutional limitations, which also apply to administrative orders, such as those against self-incrimination, unreasonable
search and seizure, and due process of law, but also is subject
to those limitations inherent in the body that issues them because of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the Constituti~n.'~
In United States v. Powell,74which involved a dispute over
enforcement of an IRS summons, the Court stated: "It is the
court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative
summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused."75
Thus, even though the Court upheld the agency action in both
Morton Salt and Powell, it explicitly recognized that due process
limits the scope of agency investigative activity.
Another context in which the due process issue might arise
. ~ ~ involved
is illustrated by the case of Silver v. M ~ C a r n e ySilver
the revocation of a license a t an administrative hearing prior to
a criminal trial concerning the same charges. On appeal from the
district court's injunction against the administrative revocation,
the D.C. Circuit held that "due process is not observed if an
accused person is subjected, without his consent, to an administrative hearing on a serious criminal charge that is pending
against him."" Due process considerations were also raised in
United States v. Parrott, 78 a case involving civil proceedings initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission contempora338 U.S. 632 (1950).
Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
379 U.S. 48 (1964).
Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted).
248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965).
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neously with criminal proceedings initiated by the United States
Attorney against the same defendant. The criminal court indicated that thispituation could also arise in the antitrust area and
stated: "The Court holds that the Government may not bring a
parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices
to obtain evidence for subsequent criminal prosecution^."^^
The prohibition against the use of the civil process to obtain
information for a criminal prosecution on the same facts is well
established." The major factor courts cite for the prohibition is
the essential difference between criminal and civil proceeding^.^^
Judge Bell, in a concurring opinion in Campbell v. Eastland,"
noted that "[tlhe criminal aspect of the matter could not be
ignored. The end result was tantamount to allowing discovery
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a criminal proceeding,
something we are powerless, as was the trial court, to authorize. "83
The issue of the use of civil proceedings to discover criminal
violations has arisen most often in the context of Internal Revenue Service cases. Reisman v. Caplins4involved a taxpayer's challenge to an IRS summons of records held by the taxpayer's accountant. The Supreme Court in dicta indicated that the summons could be challenged on any appropriate grounds, including
the allegation that the material was being sought for the improper
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution."
The Court next dealt with the issue of what constitutes an
improper use of an IRS summons in Donaldson v. United States. 86
The IRS had issued a summons to Donaldson's former employers
and his accountant for records relating to Donaldson's compensation. The employer refused to comply, and the IRS filed an action
in district court to enforce the summons. Donaldson intervened,
alleging that the summons was being used solely to obtain infor79. Id. at 202.
80. For a discussion of these prohibitions, see Comment, Concurrent Civil and CrimiL. REV.1277 (1967); Note, Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to
nal Proceedings, 67 COLUM.
Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH.
L. REV.738 (1968).
81. See United States v. Mellon Bank, 545 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1976); Campbell v.
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Steffes, 35 F.R.D. 24 (D. Mont.
1964).
82. 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
83. 307 F.2d at 492-93 (Bell, J., concurring).
84. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
85. Id. at 449.
86. 400 U.S. 571 (1971).
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mation against him for use in a later criminal trial. The Supreme
Court held that Donaldson had no protectable interest or privilege that would permit intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2). The Court also held that an IRS summons
could be used in connection with a criminal investigation if issued
in good faith and prior to a recommendation for prosecution. The
Court intimated, however, that use of an IRS summons was not
permitted if its sole purpose was to gather information for a criminal trial
In the most recent case involving an IRS summons, United
States v. LaSalle National Bank,ss the Court further described
the good faith requirement. In LaSalle National Bank an IRS
special agent issued a summons to the bank to obtain information
concerning the tax liability of a bank customer. The district court
refused to enforce the summons since the agent admitted that his
sole purpose in issuing it was to gain information for a criminal
prosecution. The disrict court held that such a motivation indicated bad faith. The appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing made several
points about IRS powers. First, it noted that Congress had given
the IRS both civil and criminal enforcement power. Therefore,
the Court argued, the IRS could use the summons to obtain information prior to the initiation of a criminal prosecution. Once
criminal proceedings began, however, the Court reasoned that the
IRS summons could no longer be used to gather information. The
Court called this a prophylactic rule that helped to protect discovery in criminal litigation and to preserve the role of the grand
jury. The Court refused to define the requirement of good faith
in terms of the IRS agent's motivation in conducting the investigation. It referred to the various agency procedures that must be
followed before a prosecution is initiated, and the protection they
offer to the individual taxpayer against a vendetta by an IRS
agent. The Court then indicated that the burden of proving that
an investigation was solely for criminal prosecution was on the
taxpayer, who must prove the absence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose in the IRS investigation. Since the
bank had failed to prove a lack of good faith or the existence of a
pending criminal proceeding the Court held that the IRS could
obtain the information from the bank.
87. Id. at 532-36.
88. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
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These cases attempt to clarify the dual enforcement powers
of the IRS. A possible analogy might be drawn between the IRS
in the tax area and the FTC and Justice Department in the antitrust area. However, several arguments can be made against the
applicability of the tax cases to the antitrust area. Neither
Donaldson nor LaSalle National Bank indicate whether their
holdings apply to administrative agencies other than the IRS.
Another way to distinguish the IRS summons from the FTC summons is by reference to the basic differences between the two
agencies. One of the Court's premises in LaSalle National Bank
was that Congress has explicitly granted the IRS dual civil and
criminal enforcement powers.8eIt is not inappropriate, therefore,
for the IRS to use the summons to acquire information to carry
out these powers. But Congress has not given the FTC dual enforcement powers. Instead, the FTC has only been given civil
powers to prevent restrictions on trade. Arguably, the use of the
FTC's sweeping civil powers to obtain information about the antitrust activities of a corporation for later use by the Justice Department in a criminal proceeding is an abuse of the investigatory
and prosecutorial powers of the FTC.
Even if a court allows the FTC to use its civil powers to
obtain information for criminal prosecutions, the holdings in
Donaldson, Reisman, and LaSalle National Bank can still be
used to the advantage of the corporation or its officers under the
double gaze of the FTC and the Justice Department. For example, if there have been simultaneous investigations of a particular
company by the Justice Department and the FTC, Donaldson
and LaSalle National Bank would require the FTC to cease its
civil discovery as soon as the Justice Department decided to prosecute.".' As the Court indicated in LaSalle National Bank, this
89. The Court stated: "Congress has created a law enforcement system in which
criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined. When an investigation examines
the possibility of criminal misconduct, it also necessarily inquires about the appropriateness of assessing the 50% civil tax penalty." Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
89.1. Alternatively, a court could allow the FTC investigation to continue even after
the Justice Department initiates criminal proceedings but could order the FTC not to
divulge any information to the Justice Department once the Justice Department decides
to prosecute. This was the approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in a recent case involving shared information between the SEC and
the Justice Department. SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., [I9791 FED. SEC.L. REP.(CCH) 7
97,172, at 96,476 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19,1979). The court of appeals refused to order the SEC
to halt its investigation because the relationship between the SEC and the Justice Department was not as close as that between the IRS and the Justice Department and because
"there is a substantial public interest in swiftly remedying civil securities law violations."
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somewhat artificial limitation was set up to preserve the role of
the grand jury and to protect discovery in criminal litigation.
Arguably, this same limitation would apply in the antitrust area
where both civil and criminal liabilities exist.
Even if the decision to prosecute has not been made, the
FTC's good faith could be challenged under LaSalle National
Bank, even though the Court there refused to consider an agent's
motivation as evidence of bad faith. Arguably, the FTC., by using
its civil powers solely to obtain information for use in a criminal
proceeding by another agency, is guilty of bad faith. Therefore,
even though the FTC may not have referred the matter to the
Justice Department for possible prosecution, a showing of bad
faith may be grounds for disallowance of any information sharing.
In summary, there are procedural due process arguments
that offer hope to the corporation or its officers who attempt to
prevent information obtained by the FTC during civil discovery
from being used by the Justice Department in a criminal proceeding. This would be particularly true if it could be shown that the
Justice Department had decided to prosecute. If no such recommendation has been made, then other arguments are available:
the summons was issued without good faith; the FTC is exceeding
its congressionally authorized civil powers by obtaining information for a criminal investigation; LaSalle National Bank should
not be extended to agencies other than the IRS. Arguments such
as these support the proposition that the use of an administrative
summons during civil discovery to obtain evidence for use in a
criminal proceeding should be forbidden.

C. Self-Incrimination
Another constitutional basis that courts have relied on to
enjoin civil proceedings while contemporaneous criminal proceedings on the same facts are in progress is the fifth amendment
In United States v. Simon, @l
proscription of self-in~rimination.~
however, the Second Circuit rejected fifth amendment challenges
to the civil discovery process. Simon involved criminal proceedId. at 96,474-75 (footnote omitted). However, the court held that no information could be
shared once the Justice Department decided to prosecute because of "the need to maintain the integrity of the criminal discovery process." Id. at 96,476.
90. See Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Perry v. McGuire, 36
F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14
F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
91. 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curium as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton,
389 U.S. 425 (1967).
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ings instituted because of alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act and a civil action brought by the trustee in reorganization of a company the criminal defendants were involved with.
The trustee was seeking the defendants' depositions just prior to
the criminal proceeding. The judge in the civil case refused to
enjoin discovery, but the judge in the criminal trial issued an
order enjoining discovery for ninety days. This order was appealed. On appeal the Second Circuit ruled that the defendants
had failed to specifically allege the need to avail themselves of
their fifth amendment privileges. According to the court, there
was also a strong public interest in obtaining the information
from the defendants. In addition, the defendants could avail
themselves of the privilege in response to individual questions.
Moreover, since it was a trustee that was seeking the information
and not the government, there was less likelihood of prejudice to
the defendants.
In SEC v. V e s ~ oon
, ~the
~ other hand, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York was willing to find
prejudice against the defendants. This case involved civil proceedings brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
against Robert Vesco and others for violation of the Securities
Exchange Act. The defendants also faced possible criminal prosecution. The defendants alleged that the civil proceedings had
been purposely initiated before criminal proceedings so that the
government could take advantage of the liberal civil discovery
rules. Although the defendants could refuse to testify in the civil
proceedings, the court reasoned that such a refusal could give rise
to the inference that the defendants were guilty of the criminal
charges. If the inference were used in determining guilt, the defendants would be penalized unjustly for exercising their privileges against self-incrimination.
On the other hand, the court argued that the defendants
could choose to testify, but that such testimony might be used
against them in a later criminal proceeding. The court reasoned
that "it is probable that defendants will suffer grave, irreparable
civil and criminal consequences should they choose either course
of action, testifying a t the depositions or invoking the protections
of the Fifth Amendment."p3 The court granted restrictions on
discovery with respect to certain defendants but indicated that
92. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.L. REP. (CCH) fi 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
93. Id. at 93,387.
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it might be willing to allow discovery if the government granted
immunity to the defendants."
The Supreme Court has ruled that the fifth amendment only
protects individuals, not corporations or partnership^.^^ Thus the
corporate official, when claiming his fifth amendment privilege,
should allege that the information he wishes to withhold stems
from his own activities and not those of the corporation. If he fails
to do so, the court can rule that the fifth amendment is not
applicable. Corporate and partnership records are also not entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination? However, there
is a privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the personal records of the corporate officer." Therefore, if an attempt
to withhold records is made, the records must be the officer's, not
the corporation's.

D. Inadequate Time to Prepare Defense
One final argument can be made in an attempt to prevent
the sharing of information between the Justice Department and
the FTC. Many times simultaneous prosecutions do not give the
defendant corporation or its officers sufficient time to adequately
prepare a criminal defense. In such a case, the proceedings of the
FTC should be suspended until after completion of the criminal
prosecution. In United States v. Amrep Corp. this argument was
advanced and accepted by the federal court in the southern district of New York. The investigation of Amrep began in April 1973
and the FTC filed a complaint in March 1975. A grand jury investigation was begun by the United States Attorney in March 1974
and an indictment of Amrep and some of its officials returned on
October 28,1975. Both investigations were based on similar information. Amrep requested a stay of the FTC proceedings, claiming
that the appearance of corporate officers before the FTC proceedings would prevent them from adequately preparing for the criminal proceedings. The administrative law judge denied the stay,
and Amrep initiated an action in district court.
94. Of course, any immunity that would be granted would only be use immunity. See
18 U.S.C. 99 6001-6002(1976).The government could still maintain the prosecution later
if then? 'were independent sources of information.
95 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974);Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911).
96 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974);Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911).
97 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911).
98 405 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
<
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The district court rejected the Commission's contention that
the court did not have jurisdiction. The court held that it was
proper to intervene to prevent interference with the defendants'
preparation for trial. The court then dealt with the issue of
whether the simultaneous actions could interfere with trial preparation. The court indicated that it saw no current conflict, but
believed that there could be problems in the future as the time
of the criminal trial drew near. The court stayed the FTC's investigation until one month after entry of the jury verdict, indicating
that such a delay was not prejudicial to the FTC. By taking this
position the court avoided the difficult issue of information sharing. By advocating the need for a stay in the FTC proceedings,
the corporation confronted with information sharing, like the
court in Amrep, may be able to sidestep the sharing issue.

VI. REMEDIES
The issue of information sharing can arise in criminal, civil,
or administrative proceedings. Possible remedies for the corporation or its officials must be considered in the context of these
forums and their various procedures.
A. Administrative Remedies
Administrative procedures may be governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or an agency's own procedural rules. The
FTC has chosen to adopt its own rules. Separate rules of procedure govern its adjudicatoryWand nonadjudicatory proceedings. loo
In nonadjudicatory proceedings the FTC is generally involved in investigations of various industries.lolInvestigatory actions generally have three limitations: they must be authorized
by Congress, the information sought must be definite, and the
information sought must be relevant to the inquiry.lo2Adjudicatory proceedings of the FTC are focused on a particular corporation and violations of particular laws.lo3
99. FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. $0 3.1-.72 (1979).
100. FTC Nonadjudicative Procedures, 16 C.F.R. 0 0 2.1-.34 (1979).
101. These investigations can be instigated on request of the President, Congress,
governmental agencies, the attorney general, the courts, or the public. Also, the FTC can
initiate its own investigations. Id. 0 2.1.
102. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
103. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (FTC coufd require
the filing of periodic reports rather than inspection of books and records in order to insure
that no laws were being violated).
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In both adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory proceedings the
principal method of acquiring information from the corporation
is the administrative subpoena.lO4If the corporation and its officers do not wish to comply with the subpoena, they can file a
motion to quash.'" At that time they may raise such defenses as
denial of due process, the prohibition against self-incrimination,
the irrelevancy of the materials sought, or the burdensomeness of
the request.
The FTC, like other federal administrative agencies, has no
power to enforce its administrative subpoenas.lo6Instead, it must
file an action in federal district court. Thus, if the motion to
quash the administrative subpoena is denied and the corporation
still refuses to comply, the FTC must go to district court to enforce the subpoena. The same contentions can be raised in district court that were raised before the agency. The order of the
district court, if adverse to the corporation, may then be appealed. Even if the final determination is in favor of the agency,
the agency has no power to punish the corporation for further
noncompliance. Instead, it must go back to district court to get
an order of contempt.
These procedures are time consuming. If the corporation
fears that the FTC will obtain information in its administrative
proceedings that may be used against it or its officials in civil or
criminal proceedings, these cumbersome enforcement procedures
can work in its favor. It is likely that the civil or criminal proceedings may be over before the agency succeeds in getting enforcement of its subpoena.lo7
The subpoena enforcement process also applies to other aspects of discovery, particularly in adjudicatory proceedings where
the corporation decides not to comply. The FTC recently enacted
new rules to govern these proceedings.lo8In the comments preceeding the new rules, the FTC indicated its attempt to give the
administrative law judge greater control over adjudicatory pro104. Administrative subpoenas in adjudicatory proceedings are governed by 16
C.F.R. 8 3.34 (1979). Administrative subpoenas in nonadjudicatory proceedings are governed by 16 C.F.R. 8 2.7 (1979).
105. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.34(b)(l) (1979) (adjudicatory proceedings);id. 8 2.11(c) (nonadjudicatory proceedings).
106. For a discussion of this issue, see Benton, Administrative Subpoena
Enforcement, 41 TEX.L. REV.874 (1963).
107. For a case that illustrates the complexity and time-consuming nature of these
proceedings, see Penfield Co. v. SEC, 157 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S.585
(1947).
108. See 43 Fed. Reg. 56,862 (1978) (codified 16 C.F.R. $9 3.1-.72).
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ceedings.lo9It also indicated that the new regulations are similar
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The comments also state,
however, that "judicial constructions of such analogous provisions may serve as interpretative aides, but they are not to be
regarded as binding because application of the Commission's
rules must be tailored to the circumstances of the Commission's
pro~eedings."~~~
Despite the Commission's warnings, it may be
helpful to examine judicial decisions in civil actions for further
arguments that corporate defendants might make in administrative proceedings.

B. Civil Remedies
What can a corporation do in a civil case when no one in the
corporation can answer interrogatories without the risk of selfincrimination with respect to a concurrent criminal proceeding?
The Supreme Court answered this question in United States v.
Kordel."' "In such a case the appropriate remedy would be a
protective order under Rule 30(b), postponing civil discovery
until termination of the criminal action."l12
Rule 30(b) is now Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under Rule 26 a protective order can be obtained to
protect a party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden and expense."l13 If any of these circumstances
exist, the district court judge may prohibit or limit discovery. A
corporation involved in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings
on the same matter could argue that a protective order should be
imposed in order to prevent the liberal civil discovery provisions
from being used for criminal discovery. Possible arguments for
the protective order could be based on the prohibition against
self-incrimination as suggested in Kordel, on due process considerations,l14or on bad faith.
Since a decision on a stay order is not a final order, it is not
clear whether it would be appealable.lI5 Under the Supreme
109. Id.
110. Id. at 56,863.
111. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
112. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
113. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c).
114. For decisions on these grounds, see Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1970);Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D.
Pa. 1953).
115. For decisions holding that the district judge's decision regarding discovery was
not appealable, see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Jernigan, 222 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1955)
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Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co. u. United States, 116 however,
it could be argued that the district court judge's decision should
be appealable because it has the appearance of finality and delay
may foreclose the possibility of later review. The issue of appealability in such cases has not been considered by some courts,l17but
where it has been considered, the appellate court has sustained
its power to hear the appealY8
Based on the comments preceding the new rules governing
adjudicatory proceedings before the FTC, similar arguments
could be made before the administrative law judge to stay FTC
proceedings until completion of a criminal trial. The administrative law judge's decision would be discretionary.lIB
C. Criminal Remedies
The remedies available to a corporation or its officials in a
criminal proceeding in order to stay a concurrent administrative
or civil proceeding are much more limited. The Federal, Rules of
Criminal Procedure indicate that the purpose of the Rules is "to
provide for just determination of every criminal proceeding."lM
This policy can form the basis for a defendant's motion to stay
simultaneous administrative or civil proceedings.
The defendants in United States v. Simod2l found themselves in just such a situation. The criminal charges included
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and violations of the Securities
Exchange Act. Civil actions, one of which involved the same
transaction, were pending in another district court. The civil actions, however, were brought by a trustee in bankruptcy and not
by the government. After the judge in the civil trial denied a
(no appeal of order suppressing the taking of depositions); Dille v. Carter Oil Co., 174 F.2d
318 (10th Cir. 1949) (order requiring deposition to be given is not a final order and
therefore is not appealable).
116. 370 U.S. 294, 308-09 (1962).
117. See United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curiam as moot
sub nun. Simon v. Wharton, 389 U S . 425 (1967); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1962).
118. See McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For another
decision indicating the appealability of such decisions of the trial judge prior to trial, see
United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U S . 922 (1968).
119. The administrative law judge's decision may be appealed to the full Commission
if there is a controlling question of fact or law and the appeal would enhance the ultimate
outcome or subsequent review would be an inadequate remedy. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1979).
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
121. 262 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), reu'd, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per
curiam as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 389 U S . 425 (1967).
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protective order to one defendant, the judge in the criminal trial
was asked to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent depositions from being taken from the criminal defendants. The criminal court judge indicated that the need to preserve fairness in
criminal proceedings underpinned the court's power to issue such
an order. The court presented two bases for this power: one was
the All Writs Act; the other was the power of the federal criminal
court to grant injunctive relief to preserve the fairness of its proceedings through its supervisory powers. The defendants had no
intention of using their fifth amendment privileges during the
deposition because of their positions in the community. They
only wished, according to the court, "to have all the relevant facts
and circumstances completely brought out in the course of their
defense a t the proper time, but that they should not be compelled
to do so before trial."ln The judge indicated that there was a
substantial likelihood that the prosecutor would ascertain the
defendants' defense from the depositions before trial.l13
The court found t h a t the defendants would suffer
"substantial and irreparable prejudice" if the depositions were
permitted.'" At the same time, the court indicated that the civil
proceedings would not be prejudiced by this delay. The court
then issued an injunction for ninety days to prevent the taking
of depositions from the defendants.
The decision in Simon was appealed.lZ5The court of appeals
reversed, finding that the defendants had failed to make a showing that the taking of the depositions would interfere with the
criminal trial. The court of appeals intimated, however, that a
court in a criminal trial may have the power to issue an injunction
if a sufficient showing of harm is made. The court believed that
the refusal of the injunction did not infringe the defendants' constitutional rights since they could avail themselves of their fifth
amendment privileges as to individual questions. The defendants' reasons for not invoking the privilege were rejected. Another source of concern to the court was the possible conflict that
could arise between courts because of such orders. The decision
was appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted,
but the case was later vacated as moot.126
122. Id. at 72.
123. Id. at 72-73.
124. Id. at 77.
125. United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967).
126. Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967).
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The applicability of Simon to other situations is not clear. A
defendant involved in simultaneous criminal and civil or administrative proceedings could ask the court in the criminal proceedings to enjoin the civil or administrative proceedings based on the
criminal courts supervisory powers or the All Writs Act. Given the
court of appeals' decision in Simon, however, a strong showing of
harm to the defendant would need to be made.
For a corporation and its officials involved in simultaneous
civil and criminal proceedings within the same federal district, an
additional problem may present itself. In United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.ln the defendants were
involved in simultaneous civil and criminal antitrust proceedings
within the same federal judicial district. The defendants moved
for a stay of the civil proceedings, which was denied by the judge
presiding over the civil proceedings. The defendants then requested the judge presiding over the criminal proceedings to stay
the civil proceedings. The judge granted the stay, but was reversed on appeal. The appellate court inidicated that it was improper for one court within the same federal district to reverse
another court. According to the appellate court, the defendant
should have appealed the decision in the civil action via a
preemptory writ-it was not proper to attempt to overrule the
decision of tlie judge in the civil proceedings by later requesting
the judge in the criminal trial for a stay of the civil proceedings.
The rationale for this decision included avoiding the appearance
of conflict within the district and saving judicial time and expense. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, but
certiorari was denied? Other courts have generally followed this
opinion.12@

Federal agencies are continually receiving more power from
Congress to regulate various corporate activities. Increased power
necessarily countenances the possibility of increased abuses of
that power. The FTC abuses its powers when it utilizes its extremely liberal discovery powers to obtain information for use in
concurrent or contemplated criminal proceedings-criminal pro127. 388 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968).
128. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 390 U.S. 922
(1968).
129. See, e.g., Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Swope, 326 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Fla.
1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ceedings that have traditionally given only limited discovery
power to the government. Such a practice raises serious ethical
questions.
The Code of Professional Responsibility indicates that "a
government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding
has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair
record, and he should not use his position or the economic power
of the government to harass parties or to bring unjust settlements
or results."lJOA sharing of information between the FTC and the
Justice Department could violate this ethical consideration if it
is unfair or brings unjust results. In determining what is unjust
or unfair, an important issue arises: who is the client the government attorney serves?
Judge Charles Fahy, in a speech before the Columbia University School of Law, indicated: "Our government is one of the very
greatest institutions ever to come into being, and to grow and live.
But is it truly the servant of the human beings who are the country. . . . The rights of the citizens must be assiduously protected, and also the rights of the general community."131In an
opinion by the Professional Ethics Committee of the Federal Bar
Association the government lawyer was described as follows:
This lawyer assumes a public trust for the government, overall
and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our
democracy with its representative form of government. Each
part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations. 132

If the public is the ultimate client of any federal agency, the
question of whether it is appropriate to use civil or administrative
proceedings to obtain information for use against a corporation
and its officers in a criminal proceeding should be answered by
ascertaining whether the public, qua client, would endorse such
an activity. The government attorney's conduct should set an
example to the public-hig client-of the highest ethical standards. Abuse of the civil process to obtain information for another
prosecution is unfair, unjust, and unethical. Another reason why
130. ABA CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONS~IISTY,
Canon 7, EC 7-14.
131. Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED.B.J. 331,
339 (1974).
132. Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar Association, The Government
Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973).
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such behavior should not be sanctioned by a court is that it is not
needed by the government for successful prosecutions. The government has ample power to secure information without resort to
unfair or unjust means. As the Supreme Court indicated with
respect to the prosecuting counsel: "[Wlhile he may strike hard
blows, he is not a t liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one."ls3 Permitting a government attorney to abuse process
to gather information may be an "improper method." Thus the
validity of the arguments against governmental information sharing, such as self-incrimination, violation of agency function, and
due process, while legally important, are as a matter of social
policy irrelevant. The ultimate issue is an ethical one: how do the
American people wish to have their laws enforced?
133. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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